What Is a Conveyance Under Texas and Missouri Law?

The question of what makes an instrument a conveyance rarely comes up when the instrument is captioned “Special Warranty Deed” and recites the usual granting language. It comes up when the instrument is captioned something else. A stipulation of ownership, a boundary agreement, a settlement agreement, a partition agreement, a memorandum, an affidavit, or a correction instrument may or may not move title. Be careful what you draft. This article sets out what Texas and Missouri each require for an instrument to operate as a conveyance of real property, where the two states diverge, and how each treats instruments that convey without saying so.

Scope: This piece addresses the elements of a valid conveyance and the related execution, delivery, and recording requirements in Texas and Missouri. It does not address contracts for sale (as distinct from completed conveyances), deeds of trust and mortgage priority, adverse possession, marketable title or title-insurance underwriting standards, transfer taxes, the federal income tax treatment of any transfer, or conveyances by fiduciaries, entities, or persons under disability, each of which carries its own rules.

The short answer

Both states have reduced conveyancing to a small number of elements, and both look to the substance of the whole instrument rather than its caption. Texas now has an authoritative list. In ConocoPhillips Co. v. Hahn, the Supreme Court of Texas held that “the following elements are generally required for a deed to accomplish a legally effective conveyance: (1) the instrument of conveyance is in writing; (2) the interest to be conveyed is sufficiently described; (3) the grantor and grantee can be ascertained from the instrument as a whole; (4) there are operative words or words of grant showing an intention by the grantor to convey title to a real property interest to the grantee; (5) the instrument is properly signed and acknowledged by the grantor; and (6) the instrument is delivered to and, if necessary, accepted by the grantee.” ConocoPhillips Co. v. Hahn, 704 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. 2024) (footnotes omitted). Missouri asks substantially the same questions, sourced from a statute and a line of Missouri cases. RSMo §§ 442.020, 442.130.

Both states are very similar.

The principal differences between the two states concern the strictness of the legal description requirement, the mechanism available for correcting a recorded instrument, and the treatment of an agreement fixing a boundary or an ownership share.

Texas

The statutory floor. Section 5.021 of the Property Code: “A conveyance of an estate of inheritance, a freehold, or an estate for more than one year, in land and tenements, must be in writing and must be subscribed and delivered by the conveyor or by the conveyor’s agent authorized in writing.” Tex. Prop. Code § 5.021. Section 5.022 supplies a suggested fee simple form, but that form “or a form that is the same in substance” suffices, and subsection (c) allows the parties to “insert any clause or use any form not in contravention of law.” Tex. Prop. Code § 5.022(a), (c). The Supreme Court confirmed the point in Hahn, quoting section 5.022(c) and Luckel v. White for the proposition that “the labels we have given the clauses of ‘granting,’ ‘warranty,’ ‘habendum’ and ‘future lease’ are not controlling.” Id. n.27. The Court has “eschew[ed] reliance on mechanical or bright-line rules as a substitute for an intent-focused inquiry rooted in the instrument’s words,” and “rejected mechanical rules of construction, such as giving priority to certain clauses over others, or requiring the use of so-called ‘magic words.’”

A valid conveyance must also satisfy the statute of frauds. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 26.01(b)(4), (5). The Court in Hahn framed the two as cumulative, holding that a valid conveyance of an interest in land “must satisfy the requirements of both the statute of conveyances, Property Code section 5.021, and the statute of frauds, Business and Commerce Code section 26.001” (quoting Gordon v. W. Houston Trees, Ltd., 352 S.W.3d 32, 43 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.)). Practitioners quoting that sentence should note that “26.001” is a typographical error carried forward from Gordon. The statute of frauds is section 26.01, and Hahn’s own footnote 31 cites it correctly as “TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 26.01(a), (b)(4).”

The elements. The common-law antecedent is Harris v. Strawbridge: “It is no longer necessary to have these formal parts to have a good deed, nor is it necessary to use technical words. Now we look to the whole of an instrument to determine the intention of the parties. If from the whole instrument we can ascertain a grantor and a grantee and there are operative words or words of grant showing an intention by the grantor to convey title to land which is sufficiently described to the grantee, and it is signed and acknowledged by the grantor, it is a deed.” 330 S.W.2d at 915. The formulation was carried forward in the courts of appeals, Green v. Canon, 33 S.W.3d 855, 858 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), and restated in four-element form in Gordon v. West Houston Trees, Ltd., 352 S.W.3d 32, 43 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.), before the Supreme Court adopted the six-element version in Hahn.

A caution on element (5). Hahn lists the instrument being “properly signed and acknowledged by the grantor” among the elements, and Gordon does the same. Read literally, that would make acknowledgment a condition of a legally effective conveyance. The older authority is to the contrary as between the parties. Haile v. Holtzclaw states that “deeds are valid even without a valid acknowledgement,” 414 S.W.2d 916, 928 (Tex. 1967), and section 12.001(b) frames acknowledgment as a condition of recordability rather than of validity. Note also that Hahn cites Haile at 927 in support of element (5), but the Haile passage at that page concerns whether the grantee was sufficiently described and whether execution and delivery effected a gift, not acknowledgment. The Court’s own footnote signals that the list is not a validity checklist: it observes that “[d]epending on the circumstances at issue, other factors concerning the execution of a deed may affect the deed’s validity,” citing section 13.001(a), which is the recording and bona fide purchaser provision. The better reading is that the six elements describe the characteristics of a fully effective, recordable deed, and that acknowledgment goes to recordability and third-party effect rather than to validity as between grantor and grantee. That reading should not be relied upon, however, without accounting for the fact that the Supreme Court’s most recent formulation provides otherwise on its face.

Description. Texas applies this element strictly. The writing must “furnish within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or data by which the land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty.” Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. 1972). The referenced writing must be in existence when the instrument is executed. Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. 1983). Description sufficiency is an element of validity, not a construction question. AIC Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. 2008).

Delivery. Title vests on execution and delivery, and delivery turns on the grantor’s intent judged from all the surrounding circumstances. Recording makes out a prima facie case of delivery, rebuttable by evidence that the instrument was delivered or recorded for some other purpose, that it resulted from fraud, accident, or mistake, or that the grantor did not intend to divest title. Stephens Cnty. Museum, Inc. v. Swenson, 517 S.W.2d 257, 261–62 (Tex. 1974); Ragland v. Kelner, 148 Tex. 132, 134–35, 221 S.W.2d 357 (1949).

Acknowledgment and recording. Subject to the caution above, recording is not an element of validity between the parties. Acknowledgment is a condition of recordability, Tex. Prop. Code § 12.001(b), and recording (with acknowledgment) governs priority against creditors and subsequent purchasers for value without notice, Tex. Prop. Code § 13.001(a). Section 13.001(b) preserves the instrument as “binding on a party to the instrument, on the party’s heirs, and on a subsequent purchaser who does not pay a valuable consideration or who has notice of the instrument.”

Missouri

The statutory floor. Missouri splits across two sections. Section 442.020 provides that conveyances “may be made by deed executed by any person having authority to convey the same, or by his agent or attorney, and acknowledged and recorded as herein directed, without any other act or ceremony whatever.” RSMo § 442.020. Section 442.130.1 supplies the execution command: “All deeds or other conveyances of lands, or of any estate or interest therein, shall be subscribed by the party granting the same, or by his lawful agent, and shall be acknowledged or proved and certified in the manner herein prescribed.” RSMo § 442.130.1. Only the grantor must subscribe. Beck v. Beck, 90 S.W.3d 509 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002).

Since 2022, section 442.130.2 has required every written instrument conveying real estate to “state whether any natural person acting as grantors, mortgagors, or other parties executing the instrument are married or unmarried.” That subsection has no Texas analogue. Its enactment history warrants note: identical language was enacted in 2022 by both House Bill 1606 and House Bill 1662, and H.B. 1606 was subsequently declared invalid in its entirety on single-subject grounds. Byrd v. State, 679 S.W.3d 492 (Mo. banc 2023). The H.B. 1662 enactment is unaffected and remains in force.

Missouri’s statute of frauds reaches “any contract made for the sale of lands, tenements, hereditaments, or an interest in or concerning them, or any lease thereof, for a longer time than one year,” and includes an equal-dignities clause: “no contract for the sale of lands made by an agent shall be binding upon the principal, unless such agent is authorized in writing to make said contract.” RSMo § 432.010.

Covenants and magic words. Missouri’s implied-covenant statute is triggered only by the phrase “grant, bargain and sell,” it reaches only conveyances “in which any estate of inheritance in fee simple is limited,” and it is construed strictly. Where triggered and not “restrained by expressed terms,” it imports three covenants: seisin of an indefeasible fee simple estate, freedom from encumbrances “done or suffered by the grantor or any person under whom he claims,” and further assurances. RSMo § 442.420. The construction is narrow in application: “bargain, sell and convey” does not import the statutory covenants, and use of the word “heirs” does not create a warranty of fee simple title. Michie v. Nat’l Bank of Caruthersville, 558 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. App. 1977).

Texas is broader as to the trigger and narrower as to the result. Either “grant” or “convey” suffices, but section 5.023 implies only two covenants, seisin and freedom from encumbrances, and includes no covenant of further assurances.

Description. Missouri does not require a self-contained description in an executed deed. “It is not required that a deed contain a sufficient description so that, based on it alone, the property can be located,” and the property “may be identified by reference to extrinsic evidence.” Podlesak v. Wesley, 849 S.W.2d 728, 731 (Mo. App. 1993). A deed is void for uncertainty “only where, after resorting to oral proof or after relying upon other extrinsic or external proof or evidence, that which was intended by the instrument remains mere matter of conjecture.” Hamburg Realty Co. v. Woods, 327 S.W.2d 138, 150 (Mo. 1959). The working test is whether “one reasonably skilled in determining land locations can locate it.” Mason v. Whyte, 660 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Mo. App. 1983). The extrinsic-evidence rule traces to Monroe v. Lyons, 98 S.W.2d 544, 546–47 (Mo. 1936): “Extrinsic facts pointed out in the description may be resorted to to ascertain the land conveyed, and the property may be identified by extrinsic evidence, as in the case of records of the county where the land is situate.”

The same latitude extends to executory contracts. In Deulen v. Wilkinson, 473 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. 1971), a contract describing the property only as “80 acres more or less,” coupled with the vendors’ name and residence, the fact that the contract related to a dairy farm, and the facts that the vendors lived on the farm and owned no other real estate, was held sufficient under section 432.010 for both reformation and specific performance, notwithstanding the parties’ express agreement that the exact legal description would be supplied later by the real estate agent. A minimum nonetheless applies: a description reading only “Vo’s bldg” was held insufficient. Macy v. Day, 346 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. App. 1961). Missouri has no counterpart to the requirement in Morrow that the writing furnish the means of identification within itself or by reference to an existing writing.

Statutory treatment of the description requirement. Section 59.330.2 requires that deeds and other conveyances “contain a legal description of the lands affected,” requires that deeds other than easements and rights-of-way contain a mailing address for one grantee, and directs that “[t]he recorder of deeds shall not record such instrument absent such address or legal description.” The section then provides: “provided, however, that the statutory constructive notice or the validity of the instrument shall not be affected by the absence of the address or the absence of the legal description.” RSMo § 59.330.2.

The effect is to separate the legal description from both validity and constructive notice. The description requirement operates as a recording-office intake standard, enforced by refusal to record, rather than as a condition of the instrument’s operation. This is the most substantial divergence between the two states. In Texas, description sufficiency is an element of the conveyance, and an inadequate description means the instrument “could not operate as a conveyance.” Republic Nat’l Bank of Dallas v. Stetson, 390 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Tex. 1965); AIC Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. 2008). In Missouri, the same defect is expressly declared not to affect validity. Missouri courts accordingly hold that an insufficient legal description does not invalidate a deed as to parties with actual notice, reading § 59.330.2 together with § 442.400.

Agency authorization and entireties property. The closing clause of section 432.010 has particular consequence for property held by the entirety. Where a husband and wife held as tenants by the entirety and only the husband signed a contract to convey, with no memorandum signed by the wife authorizing him as her agent and no subsequent ratification, the buyer could not recover. Austin & Bass Builders, Inc. v. Lewis, 359 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1962). The marital-status recital required by section 442.130.2 addresses this circumstance.

Delivery. As in Texas, delivery turns on intent, and the controlling question is “whether the grantor parted with dominion over the instrument with the intention of relinquishing all dominion over it and of making it presently operative as a conveyance of the title to the land.” Shroyer v. Shroyer, 425 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. 1968), as summarized in Meadows v. Brich, 606 S.W.2d 258, 260–61 (Mo. App. 1980). Manual transfer is not required. “There may be a delivery notwithstanding the deed remains in the custody of the grantor,” and a valid delivery is not undone by the grantee handing the deed back for safekeeping. Conversely, physical delivery does not establish it: “A manual delivery of a deed is not conclusive proof of a delivery, since the transfer of the dominion and control over the deed must be unhampered with the reservation of any right of revocation or recall and must be with the intent to presently pass title.” Klatt v. Wolff, 173 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Mo. 1943).

Recording creates a presumption of delivery, though it is not itself delivery. Rebmann v. Rebmann, 384 S.W.2d 663, 665–66 (Mo. 1964). The converse rule is stated more strongly than a presumption: where the deed, although acknowledged, is unrecorded and in the grantor’s possession at death, those circumstances “unless explained, are deemed conclusive” against delivery. Meadows, 606 S.W.2d at 261.

Acknowledgment and recording. Section 442.400 is framed as a validity rule with an express carve-out: “No such instrument in writing shall be valid, except between the parties thereto, and such as have actual notice thereof, until the same shall be deposited with the recorder for record.” Recording imparts notice from the time of filing. RSMo § 442.390. Acknowledgment is likewise not a validity element between the parties, notwithstanding that section 442.130.1 provides on its face that deeds “shall be acknowledged or proved and certified.” Missouri has addressed the same statutory tension now presented in Texas, and resolved it against treating acknowledgment as an element of validity: “The acknowledgment of a deed is not necessary to its validity. It only dispenses with the proof of execution, and entitles the deed to go upon the record.” Geer v. Mo. Lumber & Mining Co., 134 Mo. 85, 94, 34 S.W. 1099 (1896). Missouri also has a curative provision: a defectively certified instrument nonetheless imparts notice one year after filing. RSMo § 490.340.

Blanks. A deed signed in blank as to grantee and description, later completed without the grantor’s authority, is void. West v. Witschner, 482 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Mo. 1972).

Side by side

Question	Texas	Missouri
Governing statute	Tex. Prop. Code § 5.021	RSMo §§ 442.020, 442.130.1
Statutory form supplied	Yes, but “or a form that is the same in substance”; § 5.022(a), (c)	No statutory form for ordinary deeds
Statute of frauds	Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 26.01(b)(4), (5)	RSMo § 432.010
Implied covenants trigger	”grant” or “convey”; Tex. Prop. Code § 5.023	”grant, bargain and sell” only; RSMo § 442.420
Description standard	Must furnish within itself or by reference to an existing writing the means to identify the land; Morrow, 477 S.W.2d at 539	Need not be self-locating; extrinsic evidence admissible; Podlesak, 849 S.W.2d at 731
Effect of a defective or absent description	Element of validity; instrument “could not operate as a conveyance”; Stetson, 390 S.W.2d at 261; AIC Mgmt., 246 S.W.3d at 645	Expressly does not affect validity or constructive notice; recorder may refuse to record; RSMo § 59.330.2
Grantee mailing address required	No	Yes for recording, except easements and rights-of-way; RSMo § 59.330.2
Grantee must sign	No; § 5.021 requires subscription by the conveyor	No; RSMo § 442.130.1; Beck v. Beck
Acknowledgment required for validity inter partes	Unsettled. Hahn lists it as element (5), but Haile, 414 S.W.2d at 928, says deeds are valid without it, and § 12.001(b) is a recordability rule	No; RSMo § 442.400; Geer, 134 Mo. at 94
Authoritative statement of elements	ConocoPhillips Co. v. Hahn (Tex. 2024), six elements	No single canonical list; assembled from RSMo §§ 442.020, 442.130 and case law
Recording act framing	Void as to creditors and BFPs; binding on parties; § 13.001(a), (b)	Not valid “except between the parties thereto”; RSMo § 442.400
Curative statute for defective certification	None general; correction instruments only	RSMo § 490.340 (notice imparted one year after filing)
Correction of a recorded instrument	Statutory; Tex. Prop. Code §§ 5.027–.031	No statute; equitable reformation for mutual mistake
Marital status recital required	No	Yes; RSMo § 442.130.2 (2022)

Instruments that convey that are not titled “deed”. Be careful here.

The Texas Supreme Court addressed the substance-over-caption question twice in the mineral context, and the two decisions read together raise an unresolved issue. Terry E. Hogwood’s recent analysis in the REPTL Reporter sets out the sequence in detail; the account below follows his identification of the problem while stating the holdings independently.

In Concho Resources, Inc. v. Ellison, the Court enforced a boundary stipulation between adjacent mineral owners, holding that Gulf Oil “mandates ‘doubt or uncertainty in the minds of the parties,’ not objective ambiguity in the relevant conveyance instruments.” The Court expressly declined to reach the alternative ground: “we need not reach Concho’s alternative argument that the boundary stipulation was effective as a conveyance. That is, we do not hold that the stipulation constituted a conveyance or that the stipulation, in and of itself, affects nonparties to the agreement.” Id. n.15. Ellison therefore removed the objective-ambiguity requirement while leaving the subjective requirement in place, and left the conveyance question open.

Hahn addressed the reserved question. Confronting a stipulation of interest that recited the parties’ wish “to stipulate” their interests “for purposes of clarifying their ownership” and that “includes cross-conveyance language to effectuate the stipulation,” the Court rejected the court of appeals’ holding that proof of subjective uncertainty was required, and resolved the case on the conveyance ground it had reserved in Ellison: “Because we conclude the Stipulation does not fail as a conveyance for the reason Hahn advocates, we need not address whether it is also enforceable as a contract.” In a footnote, the Court added that “the boundary stipulation in Concho Resources did include conveyance language.” Id. n.24. Taken together, the two decisions eliminate both the objective and the subjective uncertainty requirements, with the result that an instrument that clarifies ownership and contains granting language operates as a conveyance.

Hogwood observes that both instruments recited retroactive effective dates years before execution. The Ellison stipulation was signed in 2008 and made effective as of 1987; the Hahn stipulation was signed in 2011 and made effective as of 2002. If the instruments are conveyances, they are retroactive conveyances, and the natural next question is whether they satisfy the correction-instrument statutes. Sections 5.027 through 5.031 of the Property Code, effective September 1, 2011, permit a correction instrument to “correct an ambiguity or error in a recorded original instrument of conveyance,” require joinder of all original parties for material corrections, and make a compliant instrument “effective as of the effective date of the recorded original instrument of conveyance.” Tex. Prop. Code §§ 5.027(a), 5.029(b), 5.030(a). Neither the Court nor the parties in Hahn reached that framework. The Court instead disposed of the case on the enforceability of the stipulation itself.

The body of correction-instrument authority is substantial, and its direction complicates the placement of Hahn. Section 5.029 was enacted in part to displace Myrad Properties, Inc. v. LaSalle Bank N.A., 300 S.W.3d 746, 749–50 (Tex. 2009), which had held a correction deed void insofar as it conveyed a second property not covered by the original. Sections 5.029(a)(1)(C) and (a)(2) now expressly authorize adding land to and removing land from a conveyance.

Since then the courts have read the regime as deliberately permissive. The Supreme Court described correction by agreement as “a nonjudicial process that is designed to promote efficiency in non-adversarial circumstances,” and held that section 5.029(b)(1)‘s “if applicable” clause supplies a substitute signatory when an original party is unavailable rather than requiring current owners to join. Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Yates Energy Corp., 631 S.W.3d 16, 23–26, 29 (Tex. 2021). Section 5.031 requires only substantial compliance with section 5.029, which the Eastland court has defined as performing “the essential requirements of a statute,” excusing “deviations which do not seriously hinder the legislature’s purpose in imposing such requirements.” Endeavor Energy Res., LP v. Trudy Jane Anderson Testamentary Trust, 644 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. denied). Applying that standard, one original grantee’s signature “on behalf of the grantees” substantially complies with the requirement that all original parties execute the instrument. Gaskins v. Navigator Oil & Minerals, Inc., 670 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). Gaskins also confirms that the statutes “do not define ‘ambiguity or error,’” and that “the parties’ compliance with the statutory requirements regarding the execution and recording of the correction instrument determines the instrument’s validity and effectiveness,” so no antecedent defect need be shown.

Two features of that authority are difficult to reconcile with Hahn. First, these cases state that “the correction instrument conveys nothing; it simply ‘replaces and is a substitute for the original instrument’ and clarifies the scope of the conveyed interests.” Gaskins, slip op. at 16 (quoting Tex. Prop. Code § 5.030(b) and citing Broadway Nat’l Bank, 631 S.W.3d at 29, and Endeavor Energy, 644 S.W.3d at 222). Hahn holds that an instrument whose stated purpose was “clarifying” the parties’ ownership is a conveyance. The two propositions can be reconciled only by saying that the correction-instrument statutes describe a distinct species of instrument that a clarifying stipulation is not, which is a distinction neither the Court nor the statutes draw.

Second, the requirements of the correction regime are sufficiently accommodating that the Hahn parties would likely have satisfied them. A framework requiring only substantial compliance, imposing no ambiguity prerequisite, and expressly conferring retroactive effect would appear to accommodate a retroactive stipulation. The Court reached its result without reference to that framework, and the relationship between the two remains unresolved.

Missouri arrives at a comparable position by a different route. A boundary agreement in Missouri “does not pass title, but merely fixes what each party owns,” and is valid only where the line was genuinely uncertain or disputed. Where the parties know the true line and agree to a different one, “that would constitute a passing of title which can only be done by formal conveyance,” and the agreement “is void under the statute of frauds.” Gillenwaters Bldg. Co. v. Lipscomb, 482 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Mo. 1972) (tracing the rule to Turner v. Baker, 64 Mo. 218, 240 (1876)). Acquiescence may supply the absence of an express agreement but cannot supply the missing uncertainty. Id.; Evans v. Wittorff, 869 S.W.2d 872, 876–77 (Mo. App. 1994).

Stated precisely, Missouri excludes the boundary agreement from the conveyancing category by imposing a genuine-uncertainty prerequisite at the threshold. Texas has removed that prerequisite, holding in both Ellison and Hahn that no proof of ambiguity is required, and treats the instrument as a conveyance where it contains granting language.

Missouri has no correction-instrument statute. The remedy for a deed that does not say what the parties agreed is equitable reformation, which requires a preexisting agreement consistent with the change sought, a mistake in the drafting, and mutuality of the mistake, proved by evidence that is “clear, cogent, and convincing and upon testimony entirely exact and satisfactory.” Morris v. Brown, 941 S.W.2d 835, 839–40 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). Scrivener’s error qualifies, and ambiguity is not a prerequisite. Duenke v. Brummett, 801 S.W.2d 759, 765–66 (Mo. App. 1991). But the mistake must be mutual: “It must appear that both have done what neither intended.” Walters v. Tucker, 308 S.W.2d 673, 679 (Mo. 1957). A Missouri party in the position of the Hahn parties would need a judgment, not a recorded instrument.

The bottom line

Both states define a conveyance functionally. The caption on the instrument does not decide the question in either. If the instrument identifies a grantor and a grantee, contains words of grant showing a present intent to convey, describes the interest adequately, and is signed and delivered by the grantor, it is a conveyance in Texas and in Missouri regardless of what it is called. Texas now states the test in six elements; Missouri has no equivalent canonical list, but the inquiry is the same.

Three practical consequences follow. First, an instrument drafted to record an understanding rather than to transfer anything should not contain granting language. The words “grant, bargain, sell, convey, quitclaim and deliver” in a document captioned “Stipulation of Interest” produced the result in Hahn, and in Missouri the same words would take a boundary agreement outside Gillenwaters and into the statute of frauds.

Second, the two states differ in kind as to after-the-fact corrections. Texas provides a recordable, nonjudicial mechanism requiring only substantial compliance and carrying retroactive effect. Missouri provides an equitable action requiring clear, cogent, and convincing proof of a mutual mistake, with no recordable alternative. The practical consequence is that the same defective instrument presents a recording matter in Texas and requires litigation in Missouri.

Third, two questions remain open in Texas. After Hahn, a title examiner encountering a retroactive stipulation in a chain of title has no clear guidance on whether to test it against sections 5.027 through 5.031; the appellate decisions describing a correction instrument as conveying nothing are difficult to reconcile with Hahn’s holding that a clarifying stipulation operates as a conveyance. Separately, the six-element formulation in Hahn leaves unclear whether acknowledgment is now a condition of validity as between grantor and grantee. Hogwood’s article proposes that the Texas Title Standards Board take up the correction-deed question and recommend legislative clarification. The acknowledgment question would benefit from the same treatment.

Citations

Cases

• AIC Management v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2008) (sufficiency of the property description is an element of a valid conveyance, not a question of construction).
• Austin & Bass Builders, Inc. v. Lewis, 359 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1962) (contract to convey entireties property signed only by the husband is unenforceable absent a written memorandum of the wife’s agency or her ratification).
• Beck v. Beck, 90 S.W.3d 509 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002) (only the party granting the interest must subscribe the deed).
• Broadway National Bank v. Yates Energy Corp., 631 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. 2021) (correction by agreement is a nonjudicial process designed to promote efficiency in non-adversarial circumstances; § 5.029(b)(1)‘s “if applicable” clause supplies a substitute signatory rather than requiring current owners to join).
• Byrd v. State, 679 S.W.3d 492 (Mo. banc 2023) (Truly Agreed and Finally Passed H.B. 1606 (2022) declared invalid in its entirety for violating the single-subject requirement of art. III, § 23; severance rejected).
• Concho Resources, Inc. v. Ellison, 627 S.W.3d 226 (Tex. 2021) (boundary stipulation enforceable; Gulf Oil requires subjective doubt in the minds of the parties rather than objective ambiguity in the instruments; declining at n.15 to reach whether the stipulation operated as a conveyance).
• ConocoPhillips Co. v. Hahn, 704 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. 2024) (setting out the six elements generally required for a legally effective conveyance; stipulation of interest containing cross-conveyance language held effective as a conveyance; rejecting a subjective-uncertainty requirement), rev’g 698 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2022).
• Deulen v. Wilkinson, 473 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. 1971) (contract describing “80 acres more or less,” together with identifying circumstances, sufficient for reformation and specific performance).
• Duenke v. Brummett, 801 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. App. 1991) (scrivener’s error is a ground for reformation; ambiguity is not a prerequisite).
• Endeavor Energy Resources, LP v. Trudy Jane Anderson Testamentary Trust, 644 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. denied) (substantial compliance under § 5.031 means performing the essential requirements of the statute).
• Evans v. Wittorff, 869 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. App. 1994) (no valid boundary agreement where only one party was uncertain as to the line).
• Gaskins v. Navigator Oil & Minerals, Inc., 670 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied) (the correction-instrument statutes do not define “ambiguity or error”; validity turns on compliance with the execution and recording requirements; a correction instrument conveys nothing).
• Geer v. Missouri Lumber & Mining Co., 134 Mo. 85, 34 S.W. 1099 (1896) (acknowledgment is not necessary to a deed’s validity; it dispenses with proof of execution and entitles the deed to record).
• Gillenwaters Building Co. v. Lipscomb, 482 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1972) (a boundary agreement fixes ownership without passing title, and is valid only where the line is genuinely uncertain or disputed), criticized on an unrelated procedural holding, Pope v. Pope, 179 S.W.3d 442 (Mo. App. 2005).
• Gordon v. West Houston Trees, Ltd., 352 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (four-element restatement of the requirements of a legally effective conveyance).
• Green v. Canon, 33 S.W.3d 855 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (carrying forward the Harris formulation; words of grant showing an intention by the grantor to convey title suffice).
• Haile v. Holtzclaw, 414 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1967) (as between grantor and grantee, a deed is valid without a valid acknowledgment).
• Hamburg Realty Co. v. Woods, 327 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1959) (a deed is void for uncertainty of description only where the intent remains conjectural after resort to extrinsic evidence).
• Harris v. Strawbridge, 330 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (formal parts and technical words are not required; words of grant appearing anywhere in the instrument, including the habendum, suffice).
• Klatt v. Wolff, 173 S.W.2d 933 (Mo. 1943) (manual delivery is not conclusive proof of delivery).
• Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991) (clause labels are not controlling; effect is given to the substance of unambiguous provisions).
• Macy v. Day, 346 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. App. 1961) (description as “Vo’s bldg” insufficient under the statute of frauds).
• Mason v. Whyte, 660 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. App. 1983) (a description is sufficient if one reasonably skilled in determining land locations can locate the property).
• Meadows v. Brich, 606 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. App. 1980) (where an acknowledged deed is unrecorded and in the grantor’s possession at death, those circumstances are deemed conclusive against delivery unless explained).
• Michie v. National Bank of Caruthersville, 558 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. App. 1977) (“bargain, sell and convey” does not import the covenants of RSMo § 442.420).
• Monroe v. Lyons, 98 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. 1936) (property may be identified by extrinsic evidence, including the records of the county where the land is situated).
• Morris v. Brown, 941 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997) (elements of deed reformation for mutual mistake; clear, cogent, and convincing standard).
• Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 1972) (the writing must furnish within itself, or by reference to an existing writing, the means of identifying the land).
• Myrad Properties, Inc. v. LaSalle Bank N.A., 300 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2009) (a correction deed cannot convey a second property not covered by the original), superseded by statute, Tex. Prop. Code § 5.029(a)(1)(C), (a)(2).
• Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. 1983) (the referenced writing must be in existence when the instrument is executed).
• Podlesak v. Wesley, 849 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. App. 1993) (a deed need not permit the property to be located from its own terms alone).
• Ragland v. Kelner, 148 Tex. 132, 221 S.W.2d 357 (1949) (the grantor must part with all dominion and control for delivery to occur).
• Rebmann v. Rebmann, 384 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1964) (recording is not itself delivery but creates a presumption of delivery under RSMo § 442.390).
• Republic National Bank of Dallas v. Stetson, 390 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. 1965) (an instrument describing no land cannot operate as a conveyance).
• Shroyer v. Shroyer, 425 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. 1968) (delivery turns on whether the grantor relinquished all dominion with the intent to make the instrument presently operative).
• Stephens County Museum, Inc. v. Swenson, 517 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. 1974) (recording makes a prima facie case of delivery, rebuttable by evidence of contrary intent).
• Turner v. Baker, 64 Mo. 218 (1876) (a parol agreement changing a known boundary is a transfer to which the statute of frauds applies).
• Walters v. Tucker, 308 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1957) (reformation requires a mutual mistake: both parties must have done what neither intended).
• West v. Witschner, 482 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. 1972) (deed signed in blank as to grantees and description, completed without the grantors’ authority, declared void), following remand in West v. Witschner, 428 S.W.2d 538 (Mo. 1968).
• West 17th Resources, LLC v. Pawelek, 482 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied) (a granting clause conveying “all” of the property conveyed interests held both individually and as trustee).

Statutes

• Tex. Prop. Code §§ 5.021, 5.022, 5.023, 5.027–5.031, 12.001, 13.001, 13.002 (instrument of conveyance; statutory form; implied covenants; correction instruments; recordability and the recording act). Sections 5.021 and 5.022 enacted by Act of May 17, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 576, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1984); §§ 5.027–5.031 added by Act of May 20, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 194 (S.B. 1496), § 1 (eff. Sept. 1, 2011), as amended by Act of May 10, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 158 (S.B. 887), and Act of May 19, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 345 (S.B. 801), § 2.
• Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 26.01 (statute of frauds; subsections (b)(4) and (b)(5) reach contracts for the sale of real estate and leases longer than one year).
• Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 59.330, 432.010, 442.020, 442.130, 442.380, 442.390, 442.400, 442.420, 490.340 (recording requirements and the effect of a missing legal description; statute of frauds; execution of deeds and the marital-status recital; notice from recording; validity as between the parties; “grant, bargain and sell”; curative provision for defective certification). Section 59.330 as amended by Act of 2003, S.B. 383 (eff. Aug. 28, 2003); § 442.130.2 added by H.B. 1662 (2022) (eff. Aug. 28, 2022), identical language in H.B. 1606 (2022) having been invalidated by Byrd v. State.

Secondary Authority

• Terry E. Hogwood, Concho Resources, Inc. et al. v. Ellison Versus ConocoPhillips Company v. Hahn: What is a Conveyance in Texas? (Is Correction Deed Law in Texas Dead?), REPTL Rep., vol. 64, no. 3, at 15 (Aug. 2026) (State Bar of Texas Real Estate, Probate and Trust Law Section) (identifying the retroactive-conveyance and correction-deed questions left unresolved by Ellison and Hahn, and proposing that the Texas Title Standards Board recommend legislative clarification).